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COSTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
CLEANUP CLAIM UNDER
SUPERFUND
United States v. Acton Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growth in volume and complexity of environmental enforcement
cases, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has assumed increasing importance in
the allocation of costs among liable parties. At the same time, the growth is less
than might be expected because of obstacles in both the governmental and private
sectors. This dichotomy is especially evident in cases involving pollution from
hazardous wastes.
4
Improper hazardous-waste disposal threatens the environment and the public's
health and welfare. Congress dealt with this threat by enacting environmental
legislation aimed at preventing and mitigating the damage.3 Statutes require
parties responsible for release of harmful waste to pay for cleanups. But the cost
and time demanded for the government to litigate each claim could eviscerate the
Congressional aim of quick neutralization of released hazardous substances.
Consequently, the government encourages liable parties to negotiate settlements
1. 733 F. Supp. 869 (D.NJ. 1990).
2. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 CoLUM. J.
ENvn. L. 1, 6-10 (1985). The Honorable Patricia Wald is a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Pub.
L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)). CERCLA was so amended by The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-33 (Supp. IV
1986)).
6. Wald, supra note 2, at 11.
7. Id.
1
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specifying cost allocation among responsible settling parties.8 Arbitration is one
method of cost allocation.
A federal judge described environmental negotiation and arbitration as a
"promising infant with unknown potential and a short track record."9 Successful
enforcement of the government's increasingly complex environmental regulations
calls for cooperation between government agencies and responsible parties in
settling disputes."0 However, until recently, both the government and the private
sector often resisted most attempts to apply alternative dispute resolution
techniques to environmental enforcement." One commentator even noted that
"few potentially responsible parties are willing to arbitrate cost allocation issues
related to Superfund cleanups.""2 Even when responsible parties propose in a
consent decree to use arbitration to allocate cleanup costs, the decree may be
opposed by an intervening, potentially liable party who refuses to participate in the
proposed settlement.
The Acton court faced this issue: Whether to approve a consent decree
stipulating arbitration of cost allocation among responsible parties in a hazardous-
waste case when a third party who refused to join in the consent decree intervenes,
claiming the decree and its arbitration procedure is unfair.'3 The intervenor, who
risks potential liability in an independent lawsuit, would lose his right of
contribution against the settling parties if the decree were approved.14 Yet, the
settling responsible parties could seek contribution from the intervenor."5 When
third parties intervene in an action to approve a consent decree, the court must
weigh their claims in light of public policy as expressed by Congress' intent in
creating and funding the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA).' 6
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially Responsible Parties: The
Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 ENVL L. REP. 10158, 10158 n.1 (1988).
12. Id. at 10158. However, some groups of potentially responsible parties have used binding
arbitration to resolve cost allocation disputes: parties involved in the Wauconda Landfill site in
Wauconda, Illinois, and parties at the Hardage site in Criner, Oklahoma, agreed to use binding
arbitration if mediation efforts failed. Id. at n.2. Nonbinding arbitration has been used at several sites
to settle cost-allocation disputes, including the Bayou Sorrel site in Louisiana and the MOTCO site in
Texas. Id.
13. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 872.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The instant case arises from entry of a consent decree pursuant to CERCLA
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act."7 The purpose of the consent
decree was to settle claims by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) against 116 settling defendants.18 The claims arose out of the cleanup of
the Lone Pine Landfill in Freehold Township, New Jersey.19 Studies by the EPA
and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection showed contaminants
moving from the landfill to the Manasquan River, where future plans called for
construction of a drinking-water intake 16 miles downstream from the landf'll.2
The EPA, along with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
investigated the landfill in 1981 and 1982 to determine whether conditions at Lone
Pine posed a threat to public health.2' Because of the large amount of contami-
nation at Lone Pine, EPA ranked the site fifteenth on the Superfund National
Priority List.' The agency then notified potential defendants about the possibili-
ty of their liability for cleanup costs.23 The EPA conducted public meetings and
released for comment a three-volume "Draft Feasibility Study" of remedial
possibilities.'
After selecting a remedial cleanup plan for the landfill "2 estimated to cost
approximately $40 million, 26 the agency sent notices to potentially responsible
17. Id. at 870; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976)).
18. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870. The EPA and the settling defendants submitted separate briefs
in support of the motion. Id.
19. d. The Lone Pine Landfill is an inactive landfill of approximately 63 acres, with 45 acres
used for landfill operations. Id. The site was owned and operated from 1959 to 1979 by Lone Pine
Corporation and contained municipal, commercial and industrial wastes. Id. In 1977, Scientific
Chemical Processing Company (SCP) in Newark and Carlstadt, New Jersey, began shipping industrial
chemical wastes, liquid chemicals, and chemical sludges to the site. Id. A large fire broke out at the
landfill in 1978. Id. An investigation by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
resulted in the closing of the landfill in 1979. Id
20. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882,883 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1115 (1986) (toxic substances reached the river by two routes: overland by surface run-off from the
landfill, and through the soil under Lone Pine by leaching into aquifers that discharge into the river).
21. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D.NJ. 1985), afj'd, 777 F.2d
882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
22. Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 883 (seventeen thousand drums containing chemical waste and more
than one million gallons of hazardous bulk liquid were deposited at Lone Pine); see 40 C.F.R. § 300
(1985).
23. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. at 1491.
24. Id. at 1492.
25. Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 883-84. The EPA's plan called for placement of a clay cap over the
landfill, construction of an underground slurry wall around the site and pumping and treatment of
contaminated groundwater lying within the wall. Id.
26. Settling Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government's Motion for Entry
of the Consent Decree at 1, United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869 (D.N.J. 1990) (No. 89-
3652) (hereinafter Settling Defendants' Memorandum).
1991]
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companies on September 28, 1984.27 By 1988, the potentially responsible parties
had still not reached a settlement to implement the remedy.' In December 1988,
the EPA told the parties that they had until May 15, 1989 to agree on a proposed
settlement.29 Failing this, the EPA would itself undertake the remedial action and
later sue the responsible parties for costs incurred.3 Finally, on August 25,
1989, the parties lodged their consent decree detailing how to accomplish the
EPA's remedy.
31
The decree divided the settling defendants into four categories for purposes
of determining their obligation for funding the remedy, their participation in
decision-making under the agreement, and their responsibility for payment of any
penalties. 3 2 Primary and secondary settling defendants' exact share of liability
was to be determined through an ADR procedure prescribed by a separate
agreement. 3 The settling defendants chose ADR as the method to allocate costs
because of the complex factors involved and the difficulty in reaching an
allocation acceptable to all potentially responsible parties within the six-month
deadline set by the EPA.'
The ADR procedure gave all participants a chance to present their allocation
arguments to a neutral arbitrator who would consider liability standards and
defenses under CERCLA, all other applicable law, the nature of the waste and any
other factors the arbitrator deemed fair and equitable in reaching an allocation
decision.3s The arbitrator could decide that a settling defendant's liability was
anything from 0 to 100 % of the cleanup costs.' The third and fourth group of
27. Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 884. The remedy included capping the landfill to reduce infiltration
of rainwater, erecting a slurry wall around the landfill to control migration of contaminants and
groundwater and installing a groundwater and leachate collection and treatment system to prevent
contamination leakage through the slurry wall. Id.
28. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870. Disagreement among potentially responsible parties for allocation
of responsibility for cleanup hindered their ability to adopt a settlement. Settling Defendants'
Memorandum, supra note 26, at 3-5. Lack of complete records concerning the dumping that occurred
at the landfill also contributed to making negotiations slow and complex. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870.
29. Id.
30. Settling Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 26, at 4.
31. Id.
32. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870-71.
33. Id. at 871. The first group of settling defendants includes eight "primary settling defendants"
whose waste was taken directly to the landfill site and exceeded 1% in volume of the waste at the site.
Id. This group is jointly and severally liable for funding and performing the cleanup remedy and for
providing financial assurance of the settlors' ability to complete the work. Id. The primary settling
defendants also must pay any stipulated penalties for violations of the decree's cleanup provisions. Id.
The second category of defendants consists of 13 defendants whose waste went directly to the
site, constituting 0.1% to 1% of the total waste, as well as two defendants whose waste arrived after
being transshipped from Scientific Chemical Processing Company (SCP) in Newark and Carlstadt, New
Jersey. Id. This group is also jointly and severally liable for funding and performing the remedial
action. Id.
34. Settling Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 26, at 5.
35. 1d. at 5-6.
36. Id. at 6.
[Vol.,1991, No. 2
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defendants would pay a fixed amount based on their volumetric share of the
waste."
Sixteen defendants (the Intervenors) intervened as of right to oppose the
motion to enter the consent decree.1 At the time, the Intervenors were
defendants in a related action.39  According to CERCLA provisions, the
Intervenors' right to contribution extinguished against all settling defendants in the
present case upon approval of the proposed consent decree.'
The Intervenors claimed that the decree was unfair because if the settling
parties claim a right of contribution against them, they would be forced to pay an
amount disproportionate to their volumetric share of waste.4 This result would
be especially disproportionate since toxicity of the waste would also be considered
in determining liability.42 Furthermore, they argued, even if toxicity were
relevant, no one had determined that the toxicity of their waste was significantly
greater than the waste of any of the settling defendants'.43 Therefore, like the
third and fourth groups of settling defendants, the Intervenors claimed that they
too should have the chance to pay a flat sum in settlement rather than be held to
the terms decided by the arbitrator in the proposed ADR procedure set forth in the
consent decree."'
The Intervenors further contended that the EPA did not meet its obligation
to negotiate in good faith with them.45 This failure resulted from the exclusion
of the Intervenors' views from the negotiation process when the EPA delegated
its authority to a small group of potentially responsible parties to resolve details
37. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 871. The third category of defendants under the agreement consists
of 20 defendants, whose waste was dumped directly at the landfill site and whose waste volume does
not exceed 0.1% of the total waste. Id. Defendants in this group will pay a fixed amount to the fund
based on their assessed volumetric share of the waste. Id.
The fourth group comprises 80 customers of SCP. The customers sent liquid or sludge waste
in drums, bulk liquids or solvents for recovery or unknown bulk or containerized waste to the
company, indeterminate amounts of which ended up at the Lone Pine site. Id. This group also will
pay a fixed amount based on their volumetric share plus an administrative fee. Id.
38. United States v. Acton Corp., 131 F.R.D. 431, 432 (D.NJ. 1990). Sixteen of the intervenors
are companies responsible for a portion of the waste at the Lone Pine Landfill site. The seventeenth
is a waste disposal company, Freehold Cartage, Inc., which allegedly transported approximately 21%
of the waste to the site. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870.
39. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870.
40. CERCLA § 9613()(2) (person who has resolved liability to the govemment in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement is not liable for claims for contribution regarding
matters addressed in the settlement).




45. Id. The group of responsible parties, the Lone Pine Steering Committee, consisted of the eight
largest "direct" generators of waste at the site. Id. at 870. The group filed suit to block implementa-
tion of EPA's cleanup plan. Id. The court dismissed the action on the ground the plan could not be
reviewed prior to enforcement. Id. (citing Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487).
1991]
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of the settlement." The Intervenors also claimed that the EPA failed to conduct
a reasonable, independent review of the settlement proposal. 47 Finally, the
Intervenors argued that the method proposed in the consent decree for dividing the
responsible parties into four groups and deciding the amount of liability of the
primary and secondary settlors through arbitration was unfair."
The settling parties claimed the decree was fair in that the decree was the
product of informed, arm's-length negotiations; each potentially responsible party
had the opportunity to participate on equal terms in the settlement negotiations and
to use the ADR procedure to resolve cost-allocation issues.49  The court held
that entry of a consent decree will be approved when the decree is a reasonable,
adequate, and fair settlement of liability issues." The decree should provide that
settling parties will pay for the entire cost of cleaning up a site, thereby satisfying
Congress' intent that cleanup costs lie with the responsible parties.'1 This, in
turn, will ease the strain of the cleanup on public enforcement resources and the
judicial system.s2 The court stated this approval will be given even though
nonsettling parties might be required to pay an amount disproportionate to their
volumetric share of waste.53
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA and Arbitration
Congress enacted CERCLA to provide for the cleanup of sites where the
release or threatened release of hazardous materials poses a substantial danger to
the environment and to public health and welfare.' The Act provides for
liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response to hazardous substances
released into the environment.55
To accomplish this, the Act authorizes federal and state governments to




49. Settling Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 26, at 9-10 ("By choosing not to join in the
settlement and take advantage of the ADR proceeding, the non-settlors have assumed the risk of
whatever their future liability may be.").
50. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 871.
51. Id. at 872.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 873.
54. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 848,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1980); Comment, Superfund Settlements:
The EPA's Role, 20 CONN. L REV. 923, 923 (1988).
55. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982).
56. Id.; see also CERCLA § 9604.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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responsible parties liable for government response costs and damages to natural
resources, subject to specified dollar limits and certain enumerated defenses.5 7
The goals of common-law tort actions--compensation, deterrence, and loss
spreading-are also readily applicable to CERCLA actions.s' The victims of the
improper disposal of hazardous waste are humans and their environment.
CERCLA satisfies the compensatory function of tort law (restoring victims to their
pre-tort condition), at least as far as the environment is concerned, by seeking to
restore a site to its condition before the dumping of hazardous wastes.
59
Deterrence is accomplished by requiring those responsible for the environmental
hazard created by improper waste handling to pay for its amelioration. 60 Finally,
holding responsible parties liable for hazardous waste cleanup costs spreads loss
by shifting some of the burden away from the public and injured parties.6 1
The Act establishes the Hazardous Substances Response Fund to compensate
state and federal governments for their response actions if the responsible parties
cannot be identified or are unable to undertake the actions themselves.62 Industry
and the federal government jointly finance the fund.63 Judicial action is
authorized when an imminent and substantial danger to public health, welfare or
the environment is caused by the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance."
By 1988, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified 1,177 toxic
waste sites as highest priority for CERCLA action and 30,000 sites altogether as
containing hazardous substances that might threaten humans and their environ-
ment."s Total cleanup costs could exceed $100 billion according to the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment."
The original CERCLA response fund established by Congress to curtail
environmental danger amounted to $1.6 billion over five years,67 which
accounted for only nine percent of the amount EPA estimated it would take to
57. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1111; see also CERCLA § 9607.
58. Note,A Proposed Scheme ofMunicipal Waste-GeneratorLiability, 100 YALE L.J. 805,810-11
(1990) [hereinafter Note, Municipal Waste-Generator]. See generally Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law
Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HoFslTA L. REv. 859, 928-39 (1981); Note, The
Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste
Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575, 576, 578 (1983).
59. Note, Municipal Waste-Generator, supra note 58, at 811. CERCLA fails to achieve full
compensation for all the losses resulting from site contamination because it excludes certain claims,
such as medical claims, Id.
60. Id
61. Id.
62. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1111; see also CERCLA §§ 9611-12.
63. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1111.
64. Id.; see also CERCLA § 9606.
65. EPA Turns to Negotiation: Superfund's Track Record Not So Super, Consensus, March 1989,
at 1, col. 3 (Public Disputes Network, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter EPA Turns to Negotiation].
66. Id
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clean sites contaminated by hazardous substances." Although the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) increased the funding level of the
response fund, the amount still fell far short of what was required for damage
prevention and mitigation at identified sites."
The discrepancy between the level of funding and projected cleanup costs
reflects Congress' intention that "those responsible for problems caused by the
disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions they created."70 The response fund is used to fund cleanups
only when it is impossible to recover costs directly from the parties responsible
for polluting the environment, either because they cannot be located or because
they lack finances themselves."
CERCLA does not expressly provide for joint and several liability,72 but
without it, recovery would be very difficult. Costs usually are allocated among
several parties who contaminate a site, because dumped chemicals react with
others to form new or more toxic substances, or because records are unavail-
able. 73 In response, courts hold that Congress did not intend to reject the theory
of joint and several liability, but rather omitted it to avoid a mandatory legislative
standard that might produce inequities if applied in all cases.74 Courts analyzed
the legislative history underpinning CERCLA and found that Congress intended
the propriety of applying joint and several liability to CERCLA defendants is to
be determined on a case-by-case basis.7 In addition, courts have pointed out that
at most sites the wastes are commingled, making it hard to establish a reasonable
basis for division according to contribution of each defendant. 76
In addition to seeking recovery of cleanup costs from responsible parties,
Congress enacted CERCLA to enable the federal government to quickly respond
to the threat posed nationally by improper disposal of hazardous substances.
At least one federal court stated that CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal
construction in order to implement these concerns.78 "The statute should not be
narrowly interpreted to frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly and
effectively, or to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond
the limits expressly provided."7
68. Id. at 253-54.
69. See EPA Turns to Negotiation, supra note 65 (SARA allocated $8.5 billion for five years).
70. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
71. Eckhardt, supra note 67, at 261; CERCLA §§ 9604(aX1), 9607(a).
72. Comment, When EPA Cleans a CERCLA Site: Preclusion of Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review
with Respect to Generators and Transporters, 36 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 187, 194 (1989).
73. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-06 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
74. d. at 808.
75. d.; see also O'Neil v. Picilo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 724 (D.R.I. 1988).
76. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811.
77. id. at 805; H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6119-20; S. REP. No. 848, supra note 54, at 62.
78. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
79. Id.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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B. Settlement under CERCLA
Congress evidenced its desire to speed cleanups and cost recovery when it
enacted provisions of SARA describing how liable parties could settle with the
government.s' A congressional committee report states, "[s]ome have criticized
the existing program for spending more on wasteful litigation than on actual
cleanups .... The settlement procedures now set forth are expected to be a
significant inducement for parties to come forth, to settle, to avoid wasteful
litigation and thus to begin cleanup."81
SARA's settlement provisions plus the courts' imposition of joint and several
liability increase the incentive of responsible parties to negotiate settlement
agreements.8 2 Other inducements to settle include escaping litigation costs,
having more control over cleanup and remedial actions, avoiding increased costs
caused by further deterioration at the site during delayed resolution of the claim,
and avoiding bad publicity."
Unfortunately, certain factors work against successful settlement of CERCLA
cases. For example, many potentially responsible parties refuse to join a
settlement agreement out of fear their portion of allocated cleanup costs will
increase rather than decrease as a result of settlement negotiations." These
parties hope they can limit their costs to defending themselves against contribution
actions brought by settling parties.s As a result, this approach makes settlement
less attractive to parties that might otherwise settle.' In addition to bearing their
share of the cost allocation worked out among settling responsible parties, the
joining parties also will have to pay court costs involved in seeking to recover
contribution from nonsettling parties."
Another common impediment to settlement is "the seemingly inevitable
dispute" among responsible parties over the fair allocation of cleanup costs.8
This issue often raises a stumbling block that halts negotiations.89 And since the
80. CERCLA § 9622(a). Several provisions in SARA facilitate settlements: non-binding
preliminary allocation of responsibility; de minimis settlements for parties who are either responsible
for a very small part of the total hazardous waste problem or who "innocently" bought land on which
the site is located; covenants by the government not to sue, protection for settling parties from
contribution claims; and a mixture of federal and private funding for cleanups. Comment, supra note
54, at 930-39.
81. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 58-59, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2840-41.
82. Comment, supra note 54, at 941.
83. Id.
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EPA can count on joint and several liability to recover cleanup costs, its interest
in taking part in negotiating cost allocation is minimal.'
Allocation questions involve complex technical and scientific facts analogous
to commercial disagreements rather than questions of policy, legislative intent, or
statutory interpretation." Therefore, the EPA usually prefers to let potentially
responsible parties determine cost allocation among themselves.2
Despite factors inhibiting settlement, the EPA and the potentially liable
parties may indeed agree on a settlement rather than resorting to litigation.93
When the negotiation between the EPA and a significant number of settling
defendants is completed, the proposed consent decree is filed with the proper
federal district court. 4 Almost all consent decrees call for the use of ADR if the
parties disagree in the course of implementing the consent decree. 95
C. The Role of ADR
The role of ADR between the government and responsible parties in
CERCLA settlements is evolving. The original 1980 CERCLA statutes provided
for negotiation and arbitration when private parties cleaned a site and then asserted
claims against Superfund to recover costs incurred." The claims procedure
prescribed five steps in the process, from the initial presentation of a claim by a
party, to the final payment of an award.97
Congress streamlined the claims procedure when it amended CERCLA in
1986.98 The amended section 9613 eliminated provisions for negotiations with
responsible parties and substituted an administrative hearing process for claim
adjustment and arbitration." In explaining the deletion, the EPA's director stated
that: "[t]he arbitration procedure is a vestige of certain economic damage claims
which were not enacted in 1980. In that the claims procedures will involve only
reimbursement of costs, there is no reason for claims to be arbitrated. " °°
Despite strong encouragement from the administrator of the EPA to use
alternative dispute resolution techniques in environmental enforcement cases, the
90. Id. at 10161.
91. fit
92. Id.
93. Comment, supra note 54, at 932.
94. Id.
95. Mays, Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Procedures Under the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 17 ENVIL L. REP. 10101, 10111 (1987). Before
SARA's enactment, "[The] EPA agreed to dispute resolution provisions that required the parties to
negotiate in good faith over the issue in dispute for a specified period of time before submitting the
dispute to the court for resolution,' and the amendments made such provisions mandatory. Id.
96. CERCLA § 9612 (1980), amended by SARA 42 U.S.C §§ 9631-33 (Supp. IV 1986).
97. Id.
98. SARA, 42 U.S.C §§ 9631-33.
99. H.R. Rep. No. 253, supra note 81, at 2915-16.
100. Id. at 2916.
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assistant and regional administrators were slow to implement this request.10 1 As
of February 1, 1988, EPA's ten regional offices had nominated only seven cases
for consideration for use of ADR. 1 2
Richard H. Mays is an attorney who served as senior enforcement counsel
and acting assistant administrator for EPA. 03 Mays, who helped develop the
agency's Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in
Environmental Enforcement Cases,"°4 noted that impediments to the use of ADR
exist in both the private s~ctor and in government."'0 Impediments on the
government's side include the following: the belief of some environmental
enforcement personnel that the most severe punishment of environmental law
violators is always the best approach; the fear that in bringing in a mediator or
arbitrator, EPA attorneys will lose control of the case; lack of understanding or
training in ADR; lack of institutional incentives to use ADR; and the reluctance
to attempt to learn a new procedure, even though in the long run the new process
may save time and money. M
Former Attorney General William French Smith posited three more reasons
why government agencies resisted adoption of ADR: (1) government lawyers are
usually unconcerned about the cost of litigating in courts and administrative
hearings, (2) government officials fear public criticism for submitting environmen-
tal disputes to informal hearings rather than courts, and (3) officials are unclear
about whether Congress has authorized the use of ADR or, if so, who in the
agency has power to approve the use of the techniques and how the agency will
pay for using ADR."°7
Despite these impediments to the use of ADR in environmental enforcement
cases, one commentator noted that CERCLA lends itself well to ADR.'08 This
is partly due to the fact that law creates practical problems that can only be
resolved through the use of intensive resources in a short time." 9 Another
reason is because "the nature of the disputes as well as the appearance of the same
101. Mays, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental Enforcement: A Noble Experiment
or a Lost Cause?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10087, 10087 (1988) (Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the
EPA, sent a memorandum titled "Final Guidance on Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques
in Enforcement Actions" on August 14, 1987).
102. Id. Only four cases were enforcement cases; in the other three, the EPA was defendant. Id.
at n.3. Six cases proposed use of mediation and/or fact-finding. The seventh proposed use of a mini-
trial. Id.
103. Id. at 10087.
104. Id. Mays is currently employed at ICF Incorporated, a national environmental consulting
firm in Fairfax, Virginia. I&
105. Id. at 10090.
106. ld. at 10090-91.
107. Id. at 10092 (citing Smith, Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution: Practices and
Possibilities in the Federal Government, 1984 Mo. J. Disp. REsOL 1, 9-23).
108. Rennie, Private Facilitating and Adjudicative Functions, Superfund Disputes and the Role
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parties in many of these cases give rise to an interest among the parties in being
able to maintain ongoing relationships," an interest that ADR helps promote.11 °
In the private sector, one impediment to the use of ADR in enforcement
cases is the reluctance of many trial attorneys to use ADR. On the other
hand, many private attorneys realize their clients' interests are not served by trying
most environmental cases unless an important, unsettled legal principal needs to
be resolved by the court. 2 These lawyers know defending environmental
enforcement cases in the face of strict and joint and several liability is often a
losing battle." 3 Furthermore, they know their clients' compliance costs and
attorneys' fees will increase as the litigated case drags on.", Finally, lawyers
realize the publicity and public concern generated by environmental cases create
a negative image for companies and increase the potential for third-party tort
cases."
l3
Even though use of ADR rather than litigation may favor corporations,
corporate managers may not recognize that fact and may resist spending the
money necessary to settle environmental cases." 6 In addition, some of the same
factors impeding use of ADR in the government sector may also be at work in the
private sector: lack of institutional incentives, lack of knowledge or training, and
reluctance to learn a new technique." 7
Currently, the EPA can undertake any ADR technique, such as mediation,
that does not bind the agency; but it may not participate in any binding form of
ADR for claims over $20,000."' An exception was created in new legislation
amending CERCLA and new regulations promulgated by EPA that call for
arbitration procedures for de minimis Superfund cost-recovery claims arising under
section 9622(h)(2)k of CERCLA." 9 The fact that Congress gave the EPA the
authority to arbitrate de minimis claims may signal legislators' intent to broaden
that authority to other claims as well.'2
Another signal of such intent may be the new Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1990.121 Congress' purpose in passing the act is to "encour-
age Federal agencies to use mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and other
110. Id.
111. Mays, supra note 101, at 10092.
112. Id. at 10093.
113. Id. at 10092.
114. Id. at 10093.
115. Id. at 10092.
116. Id. at 10093-94.
117. Id. at 10094.
118. Id. at 10095.
119. CERCLA § 9622(hX2); 40 CFR §§ 304.10-42 (1989) (provides that these claims must not
exceed S500,000, exclusive of interest).
120. Mays, supra note 101, at 10095.
121. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552,104 Stat. 2736, (1990)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590 (1990)).
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techniques for the prompt and informal resolution of disputes."12 2 The Act calls
for each federal agency to adopt a policy to use alternative means of dispute
resolution and case management in enforcement actions, rule making, formal and
informal adjudications, contract administration, issuing and revoking licenses or
permits, litigation, and other agency actions.1 23
One commentator recommends that EPA personnel give potentially liable
parties "informal advice, similar to that of a non-binding arbitrator," on how to
equitably allocate costs.1 2 4  However, EPA's current philosophy is that
responsible parties should "work out among themselves questions of how much
each will pay towards settlement at a site. "125
Courts, too, play a role in settlement of environmental disputes, a role that
has changed with the proliferation of statutes and regulations. 2 6 Federal Judge
Harold Leventhal noted that courts no longer play a major part in formulating
rules governing the environment. 27 As executive officials and regulatory
agencies assumed the primary responsibility for rule making, courts maintained a
supervisory function of reviewing agency decisions.128
According to Judge Leventhal, the government agency has the latitude to
select policies deemed in the public interest, while the court's function is to assure
that the agency has "given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and
issues" in making its decision. 29  If the agency takes a "hard look" at the
pertinent problems and genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making, the court
should exercise restraint and affirm the agency's decision "even though the court
would on its own account have made different findings or adopted different
standards."' 3" The process of judicial review of agency decisions "combines
judicial supervision with ... judicial restraint, an awareness that agencies and
courts together constitute a 'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest, and
are 'collaborative instruments.' "1 31
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Comment, supra note 54, at 946.
125. Id.
126. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
509, 510 (1974).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 511 (the problems of allocating roles between regulatory agencies and courts occurred
earlier in contexts outside of environmental law). Writing for the court in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. F.C.C., a case marking the culmination of a 16-year struggle to determine which licensee
could operate a television station on a certain channel, Judge Leventhal said the court must "satisfy
itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from or
ignore the ascertainable legislative intent." 444 F.2d 841,850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971).
129. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 851-52 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Braniff Airways
v. C. A. B., 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F. P. C., 379 F.2d 153,
160 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1967); WAIT Radio v. F. C. C., 418 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
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B. Consent Decrees and Intervention under CERCLA
The commonality of consent decrees is a recent occurrence in environmental
cases.132 Because consent decrees are negotiated voluntarily like a contract but
are enforceable with court sanctions like a judgment, many consider them to be
the most effective and cheapest way to implement a remedial plan.
133
One hallmark of public-law litigation is its tendency to affect third
parties." When third parties seek to enjoin implementation of a consent decree
on grounds the decree requires a defendant to take action violating the third
party's rights, courts require the third party to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 24 rather than bring a separate action. 131 CERCLA provides
a similar right to intervene.136 Both CERCLA and Federal Rule 24 establish a
four-part requirement for an intervention of right: the motion must be timely; the
applicant must have sufficient interest in the litigation; disposition of the action
may impair or impede that interest; and the interest is not adequately represented
by an existing party to the litigation.
137
Use of intervention pursuant to Rule 24 accommodates two potentially
conflicting goals: "achieving judicial economies of scale by resolving related issues
in a single lawsuit, [and preventing the lawsuit from becoming] fruitlessly complex
or unending"."
Approval of a proposed consent decree is a matter of district court discretion,
which is to be exercised in light of the strong policy favoring voluntary settlement
of disputes.'39 The controlling criteria is not what might have been agreed on
nor what the district court believes might have been the optimal settlement.' 4°
132. Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 321,321 (1988)
(consent decrees were previously thought to be mainly part of antitrust law); see Percival, The Bounds
of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. CI.
LEGAL F. 327, 328 & n.5; Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VI! Consent Decrees
and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE LJ. 887, 888.
133. Kramer, supra note 132, at 328 (citing United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1152
n.9 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc);
McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent 18
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11, 47 (1984); Note, Participation and Department of Justice School
Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811, 1830 (1986)).
134. Id. at 321.
135. Id. at 332. The third party may bring an independent action alleging the consent decree
breached prior contractual rights if the remedy sought is damages. Id.
136. CERCLA § 9613(1).
137. United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 576 (W.D. Wis. 1990); see Harris
v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom., 484 U.S. 947 (1987).
138. United States v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Smuck v. I obson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Ci. 1969)).
139. United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1035 (D. Mass. 1989), affid, 899
F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 776 F.2d 410, 411 (2d
Cir. 1985) (court approved consent decree under CERCLA where 47 settling defendants agreed to
accept the decree's terms and seven non-settling defendants opposed the decree on fairness grounds)).
140. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. at 1036.
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In evaluating the fairness of a consent decree, the court "should examine both
procedural and substantive aspects of the proposed decree".,4 Fairness "should
be examined from the standpoint of both signatories and non-parties to the decree,
[but the effect on non-settlers] is not determinative of the court's evaluation". 42
Just because different types of settlements exist in a single CERCLA action, the
settlements are not necessarily unfair. 4 '
The court in United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp.1 " stated that
allowing potentially responsible parties to join the settlement of their choice might
thwart Congress' goal of encouraging early settlement, thereby complicating
CERCIA settlements and defeating the public's interest in prompt cleanup.14
"In fact, the statutory scheme is designed to discourage 'free riders' by imposing
a greater share of cleanup costs on those who delay agreeing to contribute to
remedial action. The primary way to discourage free riders is to impose a cost for
delay."'"
For a district court reviewing a consent decree, the question is not whether
the settlement is perfect, but "whether it is one which is fair, adequate, and
reasonable", and within the reaches of the public interest. 4 7 Reviewing a
consent decree under CERCLA, the court in United States v. Rohm & Hass
Co.'" said its task was not to thoroughly investigate as if it were trying the case
de novo and making findings of fact as to "whether the settlement figure is exactly
proportionate to the share of liability appropriately attributed to the settling
parties." ' 49 Instead, the court stated the goal of its review was to determine ifthe settlement "represents a reasonable compromise, all the while bearing in mind
141. Id. at 1039.
142. Id. at 1040.
143. Id.; United States v. Seymour Recycling, 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (court
found nothing unfair in government's decision to structure two settlements with two groups of
defendants in different ways and to make separate settlement offers to different parties, even where the
sum to be paid by non-parties to the decree was greater than the sum being paid by the parties to the
decree). The Seymour court noted, 'There is a public interest in encouraging parties to come forward
first in an effort to settle enforcement cases.* 554 F. Supp. at 1339 (the consent decree is printed in
the case at 1342-50).
144. 720 F. Supp. 1027.
145. Id. at 1040.
146. Id.
147. United States v. Rohm & Hass Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 680 (D.N.J. 1989) (the court approved
a proposed consent decree pursuant to a CERCLA claim despite non-settling defendants' claim the
settling parties' payment did not adequately reflect their proportionate share of the waste). The court
held: "(t]here is a real risk that the dollar figure is disproportionate to the volumetric share of the
settlors, and thereby, of significant prejudice to the non-settling defendants. At the same time,
however, the settlement is a reasonable and fair compromise." Id. at 696.
148. 721 F. Supp 666.
149. Id. at 696.
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the law's generally favorable disposition toward the voluntary settlement of
litigation and CERCLA's specific preference for such resolution."' 50
The court in United States v. Mid-state Disposal, Inc.' approved a consent
decree despite Intervenors' objection, noting "[iut is not within the Court's purview
to closely scrutinize the allocation of liability among the potentially responsible
parties."" 2 The court stated its core concern was whether the consent decree
furthers the goals of CERCLA, one of which is "to promote the speedy resolution
of harmful environmental concerns." 3'
The instant case presented the court an opportunity to approve an environ-
mental consent degree with a binding arbitration provision that third-party
intervenors opposed on fairness grounds."
IV. THE INSTANT OPINION
The Acton court noted that public interest deserves considerable weight in
evaluating the reasonableness of a consent decree.'33  Under the proposed
decree, the settling parties would pay the entire cleanup costs, a result preferable
to requiring the EPA to use Superfund monies to fund the costs.'$6 The court
noted that Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA was to have response activities
funded by the parties responsible for the contamination.'5 7 The court also stated
that approval of the consent decree would ease the strain caused by the cleanup
on public enforcement resources and the court."' 8 Therefore, the court held that
public policy as reflected in CERCLA favored settlement and Congress' goal
"should not be thwarted absent overriding fairness concerns" 9
The court stated its scope of review did not allow for a de novo study of the
liability allocation and that a compromise settlement in an action such as the
instant case always contains a degree of uncertainty as to each party's liabili-
150. Id. at 680-81. The court used a six-factor test to evaluate the reasonableness of the decree:
1) relative costs and benefits of litigating the case under CERCLA; 2) risks of establishing settlors'
liability; 3) good-faith efforts and adversarial relationship of the settlement negotiators; 4)
reasonableness of the settlement compared to settlors' potential volumetric contribution; 5) settlors'
ability to withstand a greater judgment; and 6) the settlement's effect on public interest as expressed
in CERCLA. Id. at 687.
151. 131 F.R.D. 573.
152. Id. at 577.
153. Iad
154. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 870.
155. Id. at 872; see infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
156. Acton, 733 F. Supp at 872.
157. d. 'Congress was aware when it enacted CERCLA that the Superfund provided only a
limited source of fiscal resources to be used to protect and restore the nation's environment and that
the cost of necessary response activities would greatly exceed the capacity of the fund." I&. (quoting
Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 696).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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ty.1" The court declared its function was to determine whether the existing
settlement was reasonable, not whether a better settlement could have been
reached. 6 '
The Intervenors claimed the settlement decree was unfair in that they might
have to pay a share of the cleanup costs disproportionate to their volumetric
share." However, as the court noted, liability for removal costs may partly
depend on toxicity and waste toxicity is an important factor to consider in entering
into consent decrees.1 "
The court further noted that the settling defendants developed the particular
ADR procedure because they could not determine exactly how to apportion
liability among the main responsible parties within EPA's time limits.1 " The
decree's proposed ADR procedure called for an independent arbitrator to
determine liability based on CERCLA's standards, which included toxicity as well
as volume.1" The settling defendants designed the ADR process to insure
fairness in assessing parties' liability by allowing each party to conduct discovery
and submit briefs.1" In addition, the ADR process permitted evidentiary
hearings.""'
The court further explained that the settling defendants developed the ADR
procedure because they could not determine exactly how to distribute liability. 1 "
Because of this reason and because toxicity is an acceptable factor to use in
determining liability, the court held the decree was not unfair in terms of the
procedure it proposed for allocating cleanup costs among responsible parties. 69
The court stated that independent court evaluation of the relative toxicity of
the Intervenors' waste compared to the settling defendants' waste exceeded the
court's scope of review.170 In addition, the court said that the Intervenors'
concerns that they would be required to pay a disproportionate share were
speculative for two reasons.11 First, if the government and settling defendants
were to seek recovery from the Intervenors, the recovery amount would be
determined by judicial proceedings which would provide procedural and
substantive protection as a matter of law. 72 Second, any liability the ADR
160. Id.
161. Id.; see supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
162. Acton, 733 F. Supp. at 872.
163. Id. at 873 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(eX3); 52 Fed. Reg. 19919, 19920 (1987)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at n.2 (CERCLA standards of liability include waste volume, toxicity, mobility,
persistence, ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, volatility, flammability, and any other factor the
arbitrator deems fair and equitable).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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process imposed on the primary and secondary settling defendants, together with
any future decisions by EPA or the settlors to pursue other responsible parties,
would also affect the Intervenors' potential liability.'" Therefore, the court
declined to hold that the decree was unfair in not providing the Intervenors a
chance to pay a flat fee in the settlement of claims. 74
The court noted that requiring EPA to negotiate individual settlements with
each responsible party, as the Intervenors proposed, would vitiate Congress' intent
to encourage prompt settlements under CERCLA. 7  In contrast, EPA's
approach to achieving settlement by first negotiating with a representative group
of responsible parties and then letting them settle details among themselves, in this
case through arbitration, is "practical and reasonable." 76
The court stated that the Intervenors met with EPA officials on several
occasions and attended all consent decree negotiations until they declined to join
the settlement.1 " Because the Intervenors did not convince the court that their
views were excluded from the negotiation process and because EPA's practice of
negotiating with representative groups of potentially liable parties was reasonable,
the court held EPA negotiated with the Intervenors in good faith.1 78
The court stated that division of the responsible parties into four groups was
reasonable in light of the creation of an ADR procedure, which allows responsible
parties to present their case to an arbitrator before determining their liability.
79
The court also found that the division was reasonable considering the lack of
records concerning ownership of the waste.1 80 Because the consent decree was
a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement and because Congress' policy favors
settlement of CERCLA claims, the court approved entry of the consent decree.8 1
V. COMMENT
The instant case is a prototype of those in which consent decrees specify use
of ADR to resolve cost-allocation impasses among responsible parties in CERCLA
enforcement cases and where third parties intervene to oppose entry of the consent
decree on fairness grounds. In the early 1980's the government designated the
Lone Pine Landfill as one of its top priority sites to be cleaned up under







179. 1d at 874.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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proposal as of 1988.183 A major hang-up to settlement was the issue of cost
allocation among the parties.1 4
The delay in reaching a settlement insured delay in removing hazardous
wastes from the landfill. This delay in turn meant one of Congress' goals in
enacting CERCLA-insuring that responsible parties rather than the public bear
the cost of restoring contaminated sitesla--directly conflicted with another of
Congress' goals in enacting CERCLA-the prompt cleanup of such sites.' 6
Lone Pine Landfill was one of the earliest of the approximately 30,000
hazardous waste sites designated by EPA for cleanup." 7 Soon, courts can
expect to see increasing numbers of such cases, where the consent decree for
remedial cleanup proposes a method to allocate costs among potentially
responsible parties and is opposed by intervening non-settlors. Courts in the future
will have to weigh the fairness of the consent decree to the intervenors against the
public's interest in the speedy resolution of CERCLA enforcement cases.
If the Acton court had denied approval of the consent decree, a cleanup case
initiated in the early 1980's would have suffered further delay in resolution.
Potentially responsible parties would have had to return to the drawing board to
craft a viable settlement policy, or the EPA would have had to conduct the
remedial action and then sue the responsible parties for cost reimbursement."'
Furthermore, the ramifications of the court's denial could have extended
beyond the present case. If potentially responsible parties in similar actions had
observed the non-settlors' success in blocking approval of a settlement, they would
have been tempted to not join in the proposed settlement of their own cases.
Potentially, the lesson could have spread to non-settling parties involved in cost-
allocation disputes under other environmental legislation.
However, the Acton court recognized and stressed the importance of
implementing Congress' goals in passing CERCLA: insuring quick cleanup of
hazardous waste sites"' and holding potentially responsible parties rather than
the government liable for paying cleanup costs whenever possible.'" The court
stated that the settling parties' choice of ADR as a mechanism to allocate cleanup
costs among themselves was a factor in its determination that the consent decree
was fair."1 The court's recognition and approval of using ADR in allocating
costs may encourage other groups of settling parties to use ADR in similar
situations.
183. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 29, 164 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 22-28, 66 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 164-69, 175-76.
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Hopefully, the significance of the Lone Pine settling defendants' proposal to
use ADR to solve their cost-allocation dispute will be recognized by EPA officials.
Traditionally, the EPA refused involvement in the issue of determining cost
allocation among settling parties because of EPA's reliance on joint and several
liability to recover cleanup costs. 192 But the EPA is charged with implementing
the goals Congress set in enacting CERCLA. One of those goals is the speedy
cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 93 To the extent failure to allocate costs
among responsible parties is a stumbling block to early settlement and cleanup, the
EPA should seek to promote and encourage strategies that lead to early cost-
allocation agreements. Passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1990, which directs federal agencies to use ADR in enforcement actions and other
situations, gives the EPA an even greater incentive to actively encourage
potentially responsible parties to use ADR to promptly determine cost alloca-
tion. 94
The Acton court's approval of the consent decree and recognition of ADR as
a fair means of allocating costs among potentially responsible parties embroiled
in complex environmental enforcement cases sends an important message to
similarly situated parties in other environmental cases and to EPA officials
responsible for enforcing Congress' environmental-protection acts. The Acton
decision exemplifies the partnership between the EPA and the courts 9" in
furthering the public's interest in efficient resolution of hazardous waste
enforcement.
NANCY P. O'BRIEN
192. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 121-23.
195. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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